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 Abstract: Among various views concerning the nature of womanhood, one difference between the materialist 
and the pluralist accounts is whether a woman should be defined or identified based on her typical female 
biological features. The former treats “woman” as the social meaning of the biological female, while the latter 
insists that one can be a woman by virtue of one’s internal identity without also having the normatively 
associated biological features. In this paper, I argue against the latter view that the inclusion or 
demarginalization of transwomen requires more than self-identification and that it demands the recognition of 
the role of ‘misogyny’. 
 
Bio: Xinyi Angela Zhao is a first-year PhD student in Philosophy at the University of British Columbia. Her 
research interests include feminist philosophy, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. 
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 Sally Haslanger developed a materialist feminist account of womanhood that centers gender, 
under a heterosexist scheme, in a social hierarchy in which women, as a class, are placed in a 
subordinate position by virtue of their reproductive markers. However, Haslanger’s account has 
raised concerns that it fails to be trans-inclusive. Katherine Jenkins contends that such a class 
identity fails to capture what constitutes and defines a transwoman and argues that an inclusive 
account of women requires the equal consideration of one’s internal identity as a woman, 
independent of reproductive features. While I sympathize with Jenkins’ concerns, I believe that 
there is more to be salvaged in the materialist approach which can be achieved by attending to the 
notion of misogyny. In this paper, I will critically address both Haslanger’s and Jenkins’s accounts. 
Contra Jenkins’s position, I argue, alternatively, that by tracking what the notion of “misogyny” 
entails, the scope of womanhood is expanded such that transwomen and other gender minority 
groups become a part of the class identity in the materialist account. Ultimately, the de-
marginalization, and therefore the inclusion, of transwomen, along with other gender minority 
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groups, I maintain, requires the recognition of the significant role of “misogyny” which figures in 
the total denial of their identity. 
 
1. The Debate 
 In “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?”, Sally 
Haslanger suggests that gender is a social kind defined by its social position in relation to the other. 
Put simply, gender is a “social class” (37). Since most societies have sought to control female 
reproductive capacities–and thus, the female sex–in exploitative and therefore oppressive ways, 
one can be defined as a woman insofar as one’s subordinate social position is “marked and justified” 
by one’s female sex (Haslanger 39). A woman, then, as Haslanger suggests, occupies a subordinate 
social position that is oppressive in a social hierarchy because her possessing “observed or 
imagined” reproductive features is marked as normatively relevant to social position (42). A man, 
in a parallel but opposite direction, is defined as occupying a privileged social position in relation 
to a woman (Haslanger 42). This account of gender situates women and men in a hierarchical 
difference in virtue of the (unjust) social interpretation of sexual markers, such a social hierarchy. 
In other words, it is sex-based. By offering this account, Haslanger is not framing womanhood as 
an entirely negative category; rather, she aims to create an ameliorative account with a focal 
analysis that emphasizes the political goal of combating sexual injustice (37). The nature of 
womanhood, according to this account, is constitutively oppressive owing to the social 
enforcement of gender roles and positions based on the female sex. 
 Katherine Jenkins objects that Haslanger’s position fails to define some transwomen as 
women. In “Amelioration and Inclusion: Gender Identity and the Concept of Woman,” Jenkins 
argues that Haslanger’s theory of gender, which assigns social hierarchical positions on the basis 
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of reproductive features, fails to acknowledge the self-identity of transwomen. Such a failure 
consequently reinforces and exacerbates the marginalized status of transwomen (396), challenging 
and undermining their status as women. In pointing out the non-triviality of the acknowledgement 
of transwomen’s identity, Jenkins provides several scenarios in which transwomen, according to 
their decision of “coming-out” and the type of community in which they live, are perceived and 
treated differently (from cis women) (399-401). Jenkins notes that, given Haslanger’s account, 
only when a transwoman has undergone surgeries for altering her reproductive features would she 
be recognized and respected as a woman (400). If a transwoman is either not known as a woman 
due to her choice to keep her gender identity secret or not being respected as one, owing to her 
medically unaltered bodily features, then she fails to be a woman (Jenkins 400). In other words, 
not all transwomen are socially situated per Haslanger’s picture of “women”; the failure of being 
observed for having female sexual features excludes a transwoman as a woman. A narrowly 
scoped reference of woman, like the one Haslanger provides, Jenkins insists, should clearly be 
considered as exclusionary (despite not being so intended), because it fails to account for the living 
experiences of many transwomen as being women and the kind of subordination they experience 
(401). 
 To avoid this exclusivity, Jenkins develops a twin-concept of gender that attempts to include 
those who fit Haslanger’s picture as well as those who self-identify as women, whether or not they 
meet Haslanger’s class specifications. Jenkins sees her position as using the former as a starting 
point but also has different ways of understanding women (415). Transwomen, then, can be 
included as women for having the gender identity as women defined by Haslanger without 
necessarily having sexual markers. Such a self-endowed meaning of woman, independent of 
biological features, is formed in accord with one’s “internal map” that serves as a guide for 
Women as Victims of ‘Misogyny’: Re-centering Gender Marginalization        Xinyi Angela Zhao 
 
  CJPP, Volume 7, 2021 4 
identifying oneself with women who are socially situated as a subordinate class (Jenkins 410). One 
is entitled, for example, to be treated as a woman (in the sense of class identity) if she wishes her 
identity as a woman (in the sense of self-identity) to be validated (with or without public 
presentation), despite not having her bodily features altered. 
 
2. Internal Identity and De-marginalization 
 The major difference between Haslanger’s and Jenkins’s account, to reiterate, is whether a 
woman should be defined or identified based on her typical female biological features. The former 
responds affirmatively and claims that “woman” (in an ameliorative sense) is the social meaning 
of the female sex--that it is a sex-based or derived concept. The latter rejects this view and contends 
that one can be a woman without the normatively associated sexual features. Jenkins insists that 
the inclusion of an internal gender identity is necessary for respecting and thus de-marginalizing 
transwomen: we need to acknowledge “transwomen’s assertions that they are women” because 
not doing so results in failing to respect their autonomous agencies (402). 
 However, despite being a trans-inclusive account, acknowledging their internal gender 
identity, I suspect, might not effectively solve the marginalization problem that transwomen face. 
It might have lost sight of the primary cause of marginalization. Jenkins maintains that 
marginalizing transwomen is significantly different from marginalizing ciswomen because the 
former are closely tied to denials of their self-endowed gender identity (401). However, such 
denials, as I see it, are in fact precisely asserted by the patriarchal order that enforces and 
perpetuates gender norms and roles in relation to one’s biological sex. It is a structural oppression 
that denies any form of gender which it deems as a deviation concerning either 1) the non-
conformity of a ciswoman or a medically-altered transwoman of her social role because of her 
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having a female sex or 2) the inconsistency of a non-medically altered transwoman’s biological 
sex and who she claims herself to be.  
 It is certainly important to recognize that many transwomen are marginalized because they 
are not seen and respected as women, but I think that is only a surface issue. The root cause of the 
denials of transwomen’s identity, as I see it, is precisely what marginalizes ciswomen as well. 
Simply, it is what contributes to the material reality of the female-sex-based meaning of women 
that also leads to the marginalization of transwomen. It is the enforcement of the sex-gender 
consistency which renders any kind of inconsistency un-respected and marginalized. More 
crucially, it is the imposition of binary conformity that constitutes the violent enforcement on those 
who fail to meet such conformity. (This kind of violence is recognized as “misogyny” which I will 
discuss in the next section.) In this sense, I do not believe that Haslanger’s definition of 
womanhood is exclusionary as it seems to be since, in fact, it already implies what oppresses 
transwomen. If, then, both ciswomen and transwomen share a common cause of their oppression, 
it appears that the ultimate goal for transwomen of de-marginalizing their status and claiming their 
identity requires an account of womanhood that does more than having an inclusive definition of 
women that validates one’s gender identity. That is, I think, besides validating transwomen’s 
identity, what is more urgent now is to identify what causes the invalidation of their identity in the 
first place. Simply put, the inclusion of a self-identity is not sufficient for or satisfactory in de-
marginalizing transwomen. An individualized and pluralistic version of gender identity no doubt 
needs to be emphasized when we have already successfully demarginalized the status of 
transwomen. However, the inclusion of a self-identification at this stage (the stage where 
combating injustice is urgent) might risk obscuring transwomen’s real target. What we need at the 
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moment, again, is the recognition of the exclusive force that causes the marginalization of 
transwomen. 
 To re-center the marginalization problem by endorsing the mere recognition of an internal 
self-identity of transwomen (particularly those who have not undergone surgery), I suggest, is far 
from sufficient. Instead, an account of womanhood should be sought that points to the oppressive 
system which precisely serves to erase individual gender identity. Given that Haslanger’s 
ameliorative approach already implies, I think (which I will discuss further in detail), the 
marginalization of both ciswomen and transwomen, the new account only needs to be revised on 
the basis of her definition to expose explicitly the problem of transwomen’s marginalization and 
thereby include them as a part of womanhood (in an ameliorative sense). An adequate and desirable 
account, then, should be one that precisely captures or targets the severe consequence that a woman 
faces when she is considered as failing to conform to the “ideal” gender category. 
 
3. A Victim-Centred Account 
 Before giving such a definition, I shall go back to Haslanger’s treatment of the definition of 
women–women’s class identity. In short, a woman’s normative gender roles, attributed on the 
basis of her sexual features, contribute to her subordinate social position (in relation to a man’s 
privileged social position). Such a definition, as I see it, involves an unidentified concept, i.e., 
“misogyny,” a term that is later on defined by Kate Manne in Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny. 
Manne argues that “misogyny” is a kind of “law enforcement” that functions as a tool for “policing 
and enforcing” the conformity with or submission to gender norms and roles for women 
established in patriarchal system (Manne 78). Unlike how it is typically understood as a mere 
internal prejudice against women, or one’s (ideological) belief about a woman (Manne 79), 
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misogyny, as I construe it, is a victim-centred concept associated with tangible and intangible 
violence. It is designed with the intention to put down women. It is enforced or acted on in social 
reality by always placing women (back) into their normative roles and exerting violent punishment 
(justified or unjustified by the law) when they fail to perform in accordance with those roles 
(Manne 84).1 
 Haslanger’s definition of womanhood, while not explicitly identifying the concept of 
misogyny, neatly captures the misogynistic nature of womanhood imposed by society. Considered 
as someone who has female reproductive features, a woman has her associated correctness 
condition and is constantly put in a bounded social position that entails subordination when such 
a condition is not met. The normativity of occupying such an oppressive position, or taking up 
social roles that imply subordination, clearly indicates a kind of law enforcement for gender 
practice. Palpably, this law enforcement is practiced with a clear goal of who is under the constant 
surveillance and who is subject to punishment. Such a subject, of course, is a woman. Given the 
unsettled debates between the materialist and the trans-inclusivist, a definitive answer to the 
question, “Who counts as a woman?”, has yet to be given. However, this does not pose a problem 
for the enforcement of misogyny. Since “misogyny” as described by Manne is a victim-centred 
concept, then whoever is targeted and is a victim of the patriarchal law enforcement is a woman. 
That is, a woman, from the perspective of misogynist enforcement (individuals or institutions), is 
defined in terms of one’s punishability under the patriarchal order. In other words (this is my 
tentative definition), S is a woman if and only if she is punishable when her presentation is 
 
1 Notably, misogyny does not necessarily require individual misogynists as direct enforcers or transgressors 
because both agents and social institutions can be a part of the enforcement system, wittingly or unwittingly 
(Manne 77). 
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inconsistent with the female-sex-based normative standard for women under the patriarchal 
order. 
 
 Two important implications of this definition, which highlight the marginalization problem 
not only for ciswomen and transwomen with surgery but also for transwomen without surgery and 
other gender minority groups, are that 1) one can be a victim without being recognized by the 
enforcement system as a bio-socially consistent woman, and 2) one’s female sex dictates and 
guarantees one’s punishability. I will explain points 1) and 2) in more detail later. 
 One might immediately become suspicious of this account on the grounds that it potentially 
runs into the problem of definitional circularity. The worry is that it assumes the understanding of 
women with misogyny in order to disclaim misogyny. In other words, if we center misogyny to 
define who a woman is, then the attempt to destroy misogyny on the basis that a woman is defined 
with misogyny seems to become invalid. Granted, this would be a genuine concern if my definition 
involved the sole intention of censuring misogyny by using its own definition of woman. However, 
I think it is already understood when the concept of misogyny is given by Manne that it is to be 
noted, censured, and abolished. By using this concept as a central part of my definition, I rather 
treat it as an empirical concept that captures the brute social phenomenon of the enactment of the 
violent patriarchal order. My intention is to take it as a navigating point to discover or track down 
who the vulnerable target is and could be. That is, in defining a woman as one who is punishable 
when her presentation is inconsistent with the female-sex-based normative standard, I am, in 
already granting that misogyny is condemnable, trying to identify those who are subject to 
misogynistic treatment. 
 
4. Transwomen and Other Victims 
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 In this section, I will explain how transwomen (particularly those without surgical transitions) 
and other gender minority groups are under the violent attack of misogyny, making them a part of 
collective womanhood. By tracking the victims of misogyny, the scope of womanhood, I suggest, 
is greatly expanded. The misogynist punishment not only applies to cis/trans women (whose 
biological sex is prima facie consistent with their social identity) who fail to conform to their 
expected social roles and positions but, crucially, to self- identified transwomen without surgery, 
and other gender minorities including transmen without surgery and non-gender-binary assigned 
females at birth (hereinafter AFAB). I will proceed to discuss, by examining the latter kind of 
victimhood, the aforementioned two important implications of the essential punishability 
characteristic of victimized womanhood. 
 Before proceeding, I should first consider the immediate concern that such an expansion 
seems forcibly extensive--that it renders those who do not want to identify themselves as women, 
women. One might ask why we should include transmen, for example, as a part of the definition 
when they clearly do not want to identify themselves as women. I think this concern confuses the 
distinction between gender role and gender identity. My definition of “woman” is not merely about 
gender identity. Rather, it marks the misogynistic condition–the punishability condition--that is 
brought about by traditional gender roles, which victimizes an individual. Wanting to be identified 
as a woman (or not) is simply different from being punished as an “incorrect” woman. It is the 
latter, the assigned and enforced gender role and position, that I wish to address in my definition. 
Therefore, a self-identified transman, for example, can still fit the definition by being assigned and 
forced into a woman’s role and position. 
i) Transwomen without surgical transitions 
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 The enforcement of stabilizing women’s social roles and positions and punishing those who 
are not in place explains the first implication that one is also punished if one is conceived as a non-
member of the group women but attempting to fit in regardless. This highlights the membership-
admissibility feature of misogynist law enforcement, i.e., in attempting to enforce the content of 
womanness (the bio-social consistency), it demarcates the boundary. Such a demarcation entails a 
forceful exclusion and punishment of an inconsistent woman, e.g., an assigned male at birth 
(AMAB) who self-identifies as a woman and publicly presents herself so, but without undergoing 
surgery. Presenting herself as a woman without having corresponding female reproductive features 
presents a discrepancy in the eyes of the misogyny enforcer; namely, she attempts to be a woman 
without having the necessary qualities for membership admission.2 She is rejected and punished, 
not necessarily by individual transgressors but also, crucially, by legal and/or medical systems for 
failing to be an authentic3 (or a sex-gender consistent) woman. That is, it is the “faking”4 of 
membership or the failure of being an adequate member of woman (because of her unaltered 
reproductive organs) in this case that makes her punishable as a victim of misogyny. According to 
my tentative definition of womanhood given in Section 2, therefore, a transwoman can be 
considered as a woman even without being recognized under the misogynist system as such. If she 
is not even considered as a part of the expectation for women to begin with, then her gender 
presentation would be intrinsically inconsistent with such an expectation.  
ii) Other Gender Minority Groups 
 a) Transmen without surgical transitions 
 
2 Robin Dembroff discusses the gender kind membership in a forthcoming article, “Real Talk on the 
Metaphysics of Gender.” 
3 Talia Mae Bettcher discusses the “authenticity” of gender in ordinary language use in “Transwomen and 
the Meaning of ‘Woman’”(2013). 
4 See also Bettcher. 
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 They are vulnerable to the second implication in being a victim of misogyny, i.e., they are 
AFABs. The logic of misogyny dictates that one should (or must, more accurately) be a member 
of the gender kind club of woman if one’s female reproductive features are preserved, given that 
its definition of women is, first and foremost, sex-based. A transman without male organs, upon 
discovery, then, is potentially subject to being severely punished for failing to fit the normative 
social position for women–failing to be a good member of women. 
 An infamous crime against transmen that highlights such a punishment is the rape and 
murder of Brandon Teena in 1993. Brandon was sexually assaulted dehumanizingly by two people 
from his friend circle, after being discovered as an AFAB, and was murdered by them a few days 
later (Fairyington, “Two Decades After Brandon Teena's Murder, a Look Back at Falls City”). He 
was brutally punished and sanctioned for his female-man discrepancy, or his being an “incorrect” 
woman. What is even more horrendous than this direct violent hatred and enforcement, as 
Fairyington points out, is the way that the Sheriff who interviewed Brandon after his reporting of 
the rape before his death by murder (“Two Decades...”). During the interview, Brandon was 
harassed and demeaned by the constant questioning (and denial) of the legitimacy of his painful 
experience as a rape victim and his identity as a man. Here is an example of such questioning: “He 
didn't fondle you any, huh. Didn't that kind of amaze you?... I can't believe that if he pulled your 
pants down and you are a female that he didn't stick his hand in you or his finger in you” 
(Fairyington, “Two Decades...”). By asking in such a way that clearly involves his self-testimony, 
which is in line with misogynist enforcement, the sheriff inserted a forceful denial of Brandon’s 
testimony and an affirmation that Brandon should and must be a woman. This further punished 
Brandon as failing to fit the normative position of a “correct” woman:  a member of the woman’s 
club. 
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 b) Non-Gender binary AFABs 
 Similar to transmen without surgery, non-gender binary AFABs, by failing to be “good” 
members of the membership club of women in the enforcer’s eyes, i.e., failing to commit to what 
their gender kind dictates, can undergo the punishment due to their non-conformity to women’s 
social roles and the expectations thereof. 
 To summarize my point, the aforementioned gender groups should all be counted as women 
under the account I provided, because they are all subject to punishment owing to their failure of 
being authentic women under a misogynist system. The first group is rejected (and therefore 
punished) for being women due to their “fake” membership where they do not fit the “real” kind 
of women, while the second group is punished for simply failing to fit where they “belong”, i.e., 
they are “incorrect” women. In other words, it is the enforcement of their membership entrance 
and their exclusion, dictated by the patriarchal order, that highlights their victimhood. I should 
present, according to the characteristics of victimhood described above with the enforcer’s demand 
of gender “authenticity”, a complete definition of the expanded concept of “woman”: S is a woman 
iff she is punishable as a (potential) victim of misogyny insofar as her presentation is 
inconsistent with the enforced correct condition for “real” women that tracks the female sex, 
where such a condition dictates the normative standard for women under a patriarchal order. 
 What is crucial and distinctive about this account is that what counts as a woman is in accord 
with one’s material reality as a victim under the surveillance and patriarchal law enforcement of 
women’s social role and position. Without emphasizing the significance of an internal gender 
identity as an approach for inclusivity, à la Jenkins, this definition unites, amelioratively, 
ciswomen and gender minority groups by pointing to the enforcement of the sex-gender 
consistency, highlighting the root cause of their marginalization and subordination. 
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 There is, however, one unfortunate exception at the moment: a transwoman, without publicly 
presenting herself as a woman, might be excluded from such because she is recognized and deemed 
by the misogyny enforcer as a man and, therefore, does not fit the punishable condition. That is, 
without the punishable property, she might not be a(n) (obvious) victim of misogyny. However, 
such an exclusion, I think, is not definitive, for her not “coming out” is out of the fear of being 
treated with violence--the misogynistic mocking and social correction. It is, therefore, still an open 
possibility of whether or not having this fear could be sufficient for her to be included as a woman 
according to the new definition. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 I have argued that the identity oppression which transwomen face shares the same root (at 
least to a great extent, if not fully) with that faced by ciswomen. Jenkins’s pluralist concept of self-
identity formed through agency is not sufficient for de-marginalizing transwomen and might risk 
obfuscating the common political aim of eliminating normative gender roles and position. I have 
utilized the concept of “misogyny” by Manne to seek an expanded definition of womanhood by 
tracking its targeted victims: those who are punishable by the enforcement. 
 The semantic content of “woman” under an ameliorative account such as the one I give will 
inevitably be defined with negative extensions. However, it is only used for present purposes. I 
believe that Jenkins’s emphasis on a self-given meaning of women can be achieved in an 
oppression-free era. In that way, the new and more positive meaning will no longer involve 
potential misogynistic treatment and be more open to self-identification that does not require 
tracking one’s sexual features. 
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